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Randall Peerenboom, China's Long
March Toward the? Rule of Law,
Cambridge University Press, 2002,
673 pp.
Leïla Choukroune
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 If  one  is  to  believe  the  proponents  of  relativism,  any  moral  philosophy  with  a
universalist claim would be both unrealistic and intolerant. They alone would be able to
recognise the irreducible diversity of social moralities and to preserve excellence from
Western imperium.
2 This is somehow the impression that we are left with by parts, if not by the whole, of
China's Long March Toward the? Rule of Law .  In this ambitious 700 page work, Randall
Peerenboom, a recognised expert in and practitioner of Chinese law who today teaches
Chinese Law at UCLA School of Law, attempts to demonstrate the existence of a "thin
rule of law" that is procedural in nature. This concept with "Chinese characteristics"
could nevertheless be called that of the rule of law in so far as China may have been
able to "develop an alternative version to the Western model of the rule of law". While
a "thick theory" or "substantive theory" of the rule of law would incorporate aspects of
political  morality  like  forms  of  government,  economic  models  or  the  various
conceptions  of  human  rights,  a  "thin  theory"  would  promote  the  formal  or
instrumentalist aspects of the rule of law that would rest upon a system of laws that
were " general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable
and enforced"1.
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3 Thus "there must be law to rely on ; where there are laws, they must be followed; laws
must be strictly enforced; and violations of law must be corrected" (youfa keyi, youfa bi
yi, zhifa bi yan, weifa bi jiu). This legal credo adopted by the Chinese Communist Party
back in 1978 would attest to the willingness of the government to work progressively
towards an original form of the rule of law based on a fundamental reworking of a legal
system inherited from Maoism and ill-adapted to the economic developments to come.
The legal revolution on the move
4 The hyper activity of legislation characteristic of reformist China is deemed to have led
therefore to the development of the famous yifa zhiguo, a government in tune with the
law, that can only be understood by reference to the second variable of the equation,
jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhiguo, that is the establishment of a Socialist rule of law, a formula
that  was  itself  consecrated  by  the  constitutional  amendments  of  1999.  Indeed,  the
writer gives a very good description and in-depth analysis of the main transformations
undergone by the Chinese legal system over the past twenty-five years. To begin with,
in the first two chapters of his work, he does this according to a historical approach,
before  adopting  the  tack  of  dividing  his  subject  up  into  several  main  areas:  the
legislative system, the judiciary, the legal profession and administrative law regime.
The  final  chapters  of  China's  Long  March  Toward  Rule  of  Law are  devoted  to  more
philosophical  developments  dealing  with  the  relation  between  the  rule  of  law,
economic  growth  and  democracy.  The  book  closes  with  a  certain  number  of
recommendations intended for states which, in the likeness of the United States—or
the Europeans for that matter—, might be tempted to promote the rule of law in China.
5 Randall Peerenboom's work clearly tends towards a certain exhaustiveness2, based as it
is on many theoretical references, being very well documented and hence having a rich
critical  apparatus.  One can only regret,  however,  that  the latter  is  not  more easily
accessible and that it often remains a little confused in its presentation. It is true that
all the arguments and counter-arguments of the defenders of the rule of law and its
Western and Chinese opponents are carefully sifted through as if to give a more solid
foundation  to  this  attempt  at  defining  a  new theoretical  framework.  However,  the
writer could well have eliminated a number of pages without any loss, as the general
thesis seems to us to be often diluted in descriptions that do not allow any real account
to be taken of the positions of the doctrine on the relation between right and economic
development and even more glaringly between democracy and the rule of law3.
Rule of law versus democracy
6 At the risk of being accused of "liberal ethnocentrism with universalising tendencies",
we must strenuously affirm here that the rule of law and democracy are to our way of
thinking two principles that are consubstantial. Indeed, there exists an ontological link
between these two ideas that cannot be ignored. Beyond the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the 1966 Pact relating to Civil and Political Rights or the European
Convention on Human Rights, it is worth quoting the Copenhagen Declaration of June
29th 1990, article 3 of which states that "democracy is integral to the rule of law" or,
more recently, the Preamble to the Charter on the Fundamental Rights of the European
Union which emphasises that "the Union is based on the twin principles of democracy
and the rule of law".
7 It is therefore absolutely unacceptable to read, for example, that "Democracy therefore
implies rule of law, but not vice-versa" or again that the rule of law may coexist with
non democratic and non liberal forms of government4. Moreover, the writer purports
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to demonstrate that the construction of a state where the rule of law obtained could be
conceived as a necessary stage on the way to democratisation. This need not mean,
however, that China would end up as a liberal democracy, but rather as a "non liberal",
"soft authoritarian" or even "communitarian" form of democracy. Thus "a one-party
socialist regime in which the Party plays a major role" would " a single party socialism
in which the Party plays a leading role is in theory compatible with the rule of law,
albeit not a Liberal democratic version of rule of law”5.
8 In this sense, why not suppose that the amendments to the statutes of the Chinese
Communist Party at its 16th Congress are part of this same reforming logic, in so far as
they aim to put in place a "socialist democracy" governed in perfect complementarity
by the "law" (yifa zhiguo) and "virtue" (yide zhiguo). The codification of comrade Jiang
Zemin's "innovative thought for the 21st century", whose main thrust was formulated
in  2000  in  the  "theory  of  the  three  representatives"  (sange  daibiao)  is  therefore
supposedly to lead us gradually towards the rule of law Chinese-style, the first stage in
the process of setting up a democracy, also Chinese-style.
9 If there is no reason to be surprised by the fact that China may create a political model
that is unique to itself and is not therefore the transposition of pre-existing Western
models, it is nonetheless impossible to empty of their meaning legal and philosophical
concepts  like those of  the rule of  law and democracy in the name of  a  benevolent
denunciation of a certain ethnocentrism6. Through an excessive desire to take account
of Chinese specificities, Randall Peerenboom indirectly comes to trample on the very
foundations of principles with a universal vocation.
Rule of law and related concepts
10 Having founded legality and its jurisdictional control, the rule of law aims as it were to
circumscribe the power of the state through law and to guarantee the protection of the
rights of the person. It forms a whole and cannot therefore be carved up without seeing
its impact reduced and its meaning tainted. The rule of law is also characterised by the
separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the existence of a control over
constitutionality and over the legality of administrative acts.
11 The polysemy and the ambiguity of the term "rule of law" is no longer to be proved,
however. The English term "rule of law", and the French and German terms, Etat de
droit and Rechtsstaat, respectively, are in fact concepts with quite different acceptations,
and  everything  suggests  that  it  is  impossible  to  translate  the  "rule  of  law"  which
Randall Peerenboom writes about by the French term "Etat de droit"7. While the "rule of
law" refers only to a formal system of law that guarantees a certain legal security, there
certainly  does  exist  in  China,  and  especially  in  the  economic  sphere,  a  tendency
towards  the  rationalisation  of  legal  practices  and  even  towards  a  certain
"juridicisation" of society that attests to a popular consciousness of the existence of
rights and a greater aspiration to justice. But the whole ambiguity of the writer's thesis
is that he does not seem to be content with a mere formal definition of the rule of law
in any procedural sense. He seeks rather to define it with regard to democracy in order
to prove its  ability  to  exist  within an authoritarian regime.  This  involves  a  sort  of
perversion  or  at  least  a  confusion  of  genres  that  is  prejudicial  to  the  overall
demonstration and finally makes the idea according to which China supposedly broke
with an instrumentalist conception of the law somewhat less than convincing.
12 This work by an astute expert of the Chinese legal field, which to its credit takes a
certain  number  of  risks  in  terms  of  formulating  new  ideas,  is  not,  however,  for
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everyone. Indeed, a reader with insufficient legal and political background knowledge
could easily let himself or herself be led astray by the dangerous sirens of a revisited
culturalism.
NOTES
1. See page 3 of the Introduction and Chapter 3 (especially p. 65) in which Randall
Peerenboom refers inter alia to the views developed by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976.
2. Randall Peerenboom frequently positions himself, in fact, in relation to the thinking
of L.A. Hart, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Jürgen Habermas or indeed Joseph Stiglitz,
something that is quite unusual in works dealing with Chinese law, and hence worthy
of note.
3. See Chapters 10 and 11 and, especially, the exposition of liberal democracy, p. 533
and ff.
4. See p. 515 and ff.
5. See p. 10 and Chapter 5 "Retreat of the Party and the State". In this perspective,
Randall Peerenboom sets himself apart from many other experts of Chinese law who, in
the model of Stanley Lubman, see in the current ideological straitjacket an
insurmountable hurdle to the emergence of any real state governed by the rule of law.
See in this connection footnote 30, p. 24.
6. This tendency, one that we had already detected in The Limits of the Rule of Law in
China, edited by Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman and R. Kent Guy, actually
underlies the whole exposition.
7. See the excellent thesis by Luc Heuschling, Etat de droit, Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law, Paris,
Dalloz, 2002, 739 pp.
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